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Introduction
There is a large theoretical and empirical literature documenting the procyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries. At the theoretical level scholars have identified economic determinants such as imperfect access to credit markets, and political distortions that tend to generate a procyclical bias in fiscal policy (Alesina, Campante and Tabellini, 2008; Talvi and Végh, 2005; Tornell and Lane, 1999) . Empirically, the literature has advanced in documenting procyclicality of different dimensions of fiscal policy, including fiscal balances and total expenditures (Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh, 2004; Gavin and Perotti, 1997) , tax rates , as well as addressing important methodological (reverse causality) problems (Ilzetzki and Végh, 2008; Jaimovich and Panizza, 2007; Rigobón, 2004) .
However, there are still some important gaps in this literature, particularly when it comes to studying the behavior of key components of public expenditure. First, scholars have often overlooked the distinction between good and bad times, capturing only average effects of GDP movements (output gaps) on fiscal policy. 1 Identifying asymmetrical fiscal responses is important for policy purposes: if certain expenditure items increase in good times but do not fall in bad times, such asymmetries could undermine fiscal sustainability (Balassone and Kumar, 2007) and may also help explain biases in the composition of public spending, or why specific spending categories are losing ground relative to others . Secondly, while the cyclical properties of aggregate expenditures are well known, evidence on the cyclicality of specific expenditure components is still relatively thin. 2 Since different public spending items are associated with diverse fiscal multipliers (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Riera-Crichton, Végh and Vuletin, 2015; Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Végh, 2013) and redistributive features (Lustig, 2017; Goñi, López and Servén, 2011) , understanding whether procyclicality is rooted in one or another budget category can provide insights to important policy debates about the macroeconomic and distributive effects of fiscal policy in general and the design of fiscal adjustment strategies in particular (IMF, 2015; Easterly and Servén, 2003) . For example, Calderon, Easterly and Servén 1 The literature on fiscal asymmetry is almost exclusively concentrated on OECD countries (Balassone and Francese, 2004; Hercowitz and Strawczynski, 2004) . Exceptions include Carneiro and Garrido (2015) and Balassone and Kumar (2007) for developing countries in general, and Clements, Faircloth and Verhoeven (2007) and Gavin and Perotti (1997) for Latin America in particular. 2 See Arze del Granado, Gupta and Hadjdenberg (2013) and Akitoby et al. (2006) for important exceptions. While the former looks at the cyclicality of social (education, health) expenditures, the latter distinguishes between short and long-term reactions of different expenditures items to GDP, including capital and current spending.
(2003) review the evidence on fiscal adjustment episodes in Latin American countries through the 1990s and conclude that the cutback in public investment contributed to a decline in economic growth that, from an intertemporal perspective, may have proven a suboptimal fiscal adjustment strategy. More recently, research on spending multipliers indicates that when output is below potential, fiscal adjustments through public investment are three times more harmful to growth than adjustments trough public consumption expenditures: after two years, a one-dollar cut in public consumption (investment) reduces output by $0.4 ($1.3) .
While from an economic standpoint it would be advisable to keep certain expenditure categories either countercyclical or at least, acyclical, political conditions and incentives may distort optimal policy decisions. A first best scenario likely calls for current expenditure to remain acyclical (except for automatic stabilizers such as unemployment insurance), growing at the rate of trend GDP, while capital expenditure and automatic stabilizers work countercyclically.
However, as argued by an important political economy tradition, institutions may prove too weak to prevent special interests from exploiting the budget common pool during good times (Talvi and Végh, 2005; Tornell and Lane 1999; Velasco, 1997) . In addition, preferences of those in charge of implementing fiscal policy over different budget components may vary, affecting incumbents' choices of which policy instruments to protect or expand during different phases of the cycle. For example, due to their different production technology, public spending components vary in their degree of visibility to voters, and hence, affect an incumbent's political payoffs differently (Rogoff, 1990) . While consumption spending provides immediate payoffs, the benefits of public investment infrastructure often take more time to materialize. In the presence of short political time horizons, the temptation to bias such choice toward visible spending categories may prove irresistible.
Moreover, in times of economic adjustment, capital expenditure cuts may prove to be more politically palatable than cuts in current expenditure, as the costs of cutting investment are harder for voters to perceive in bad times.
In this paper, we study the cyclical properties of two important expenditure categories Our paper contributes to the literature on fiscal policy cyclicality in several ways.
Empirically, we identify a new regularity regarding the asymmetrical behavior of two major budget categories (current and public investment spending) for a large sample of emerging and developing economies. While fiscal asymmetry in developing countries has been studied in the past, extant studies have concentrated on either total (Carneiro and Garrido, 2015; Balassone and Kumar, 2007) or social spending such as education and health (Arze del Granado, Gupta and Hadjdenberg, 2013) . Previous research that has looked at the cyclical behavior of current/capital spending has not addressed whether procyclicality originates specifically in good or bad times (Akitoby et al., 2006) , or has done so for only a subset of economies (oil-exporting countries) in the context of studying exchange rate dynamics (Arezki and Imsail, 2013) .
While traditional explanations are a good starting point to uncover the reasons why policymakers pursue procyclical fiscal policies in general, they cannot fully account for the composition of the fiscal asymmetry in particular: that is, a policy pattern in which public investment gets adjusted during bad times, and current spending is boosted during good times. For example, imperfect access to international credit markets during bad times may leave governments with no choice but to cut spending, but it remains unclear which specific budget categories should bear the brunt of fiscal adjustment. To the extent that the multiplier of capital expenditure is larger than that of current expenditure, it may be beneficial to protect or expand capital expenditure to sustain aggregate demand. Moreover, while weak institutions should facilitate interest group lobbying that would push public expenditures upwards during good times, there is no clear-cut answer about which components are subject to such procyclical pressures. Thus, our second contribution is to test a political economy mechanism that could account for the results we observe.
We put forward the hypothesis that political time horizons are an important determinant of fiscal asymmetrical behavior. Politicians facing shorter time horizons are more likely to engage in asymmetric fiscal behavior, because of the variation in political payoffs associated with each spending component. Vis-à-vis current expenditures, the costs of cutting investment are harder for voters to perceive in bad times; and vis-à-vis capital spending, the benefits of providing current expenditures in good times are more immediate (Rogoff, 1990) . While Rogoff's hypothesis that public spending shifts towards more visible current expenditures has been tested before in the context of the study of fiscal policy decisions around elections (Vergne, 2009; Katsimi and Sarantides, 2012; Gupta, Liu and Mulas Granados, 2016) , we argue it can also shed light on the decision to adapt fiscal policy to changing economic circumstances. Finally, by focusing on policymaker's incentives in relation to their time or planning horizons, we contribute to an empirical literature emphasizing the intertemporal dimension of economic policymaking in general (Jalles, Mulas Granados and Tavares, 2017; Tommasi, Scartascini and Stein, 2014) , and fiscal policy in particular Case, 1995 and 2003; Crain and Oakley, 1995; Nogare and Ricciuti, 2011) .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous contributions on the political economy of procyclical spending, highlights key limitations, and briefly develops a new political mechanism that could account for asymmetrical fiscal responses. Section 3 presents the data and empirical strategy, and Section 4 presents stylized facts regarding fiscal asymmetry in developing countries and contrasting evidence among advanced economies. Section 5 traces the determinants of asymmetrical fiscal behavior, including the role of political time horizons. Section 6 goes a step further by testing the argument against plausible alternative explanations, and adds a number of robustness checks. Conclusions follow.
Literature Review: Economics, Institutions, and Political Incentives
As argued in the introduction, the literature on fiscal procyclicality has advanced greatly on both theoretical and empirical grounds over the last twenty years. Starting with Gavin and Perotti (1997) seminal contribution, first-generation studies tended to focus on the economic causes of procyclicality. In this line of research, developing countries find it hard to follow countercyclical policy because they lack access to international credit during recessions, suggesting that any explanation of procyclical behavior needs to take into account credit constraints or limited creditworthiness (Riascos and Végh, 2003; Gavin et al., 1996) . In addition to credit constraints, tax base volatility has also been associated with procyclical biases (Talvi and Végh, 2005) .
However, the problem with these type of economic explanations lies in the inability to provide answers to the following: why can't countries self-insure by accumulating fiscal resources in good times? Why would lenders not provide funds to countries if they were convinced that borrowing would help smooth out the cycle in the first place? To answer these questions, the literature turned to the political arena.
Political economy explanations of procyclicality build on the idea that fiscal decisions are the result of political processes that involve diverse actors with varied interests. These interactions take place mainly between politicians and voters, and between politicians that represent diverse interests or constituencies. In this tradition, scholars have identified two types of political distortions that tend to generate a procyclical bias in fiscal policy: cooperation and principal agent problems (Alesina, Campante and Tabellini, 2008; Talvi and Végh, 2005; Tornell and Lane, 1999) .
A classic example of a cooperation problem is the well-known common pool problem (Ostrom, 1990) . In fiscal policy, the common pool is the budget that political players draw upon (financed from a general tax fund) to generate concentrated benefits (such as targeted public policies). Tornell and Lane (1999) develop a model in which multiple political groups compete for a share of the common pool, leading to a "voracity effect": a more than proportional increase in spending in response to shocks, such as a terms of trade windfall. Similarly, Talvi and Végh (2005) advance a model in which abundant fiscal resources create pressures to increase public spending. What factors determine the intensity of the voracity effect, and hence, the level of procyclicality in practice?
First, the number of actors drawing from the common pool has been found to be a relevant determinant of the voracity effect. The pressure to overspend during upturns increases as the number of groups increases. Braun (2001) and Lane (2003) find evidence consistent with this hypothesis for developing and OECD countries respectively: as the number of political veto players increases, fiscal policy becomes more procyclical. In addition to fragmentation, polarization has also been hypothesized as a key determinant of procyclicality (Humphreys and Sandbu, 2007; Ilzetzki, 2011; Woo, 2009 ). The intuition is that as the preferences over the desired distribution of public spending between political groups diverge (or more generally, the deeper the 6 division prevalent among the groups), the greater will be the incentive of policymakers to spend too much while in power, leading to procyclical fiscal policies.
Against this backdrop, the quality of political and fiscal institutions has been argued to provide credible mechanisms to tone down political pressures from taking place, and thus, act as an "antidote" against procyclical biases in public spending. For example, Frankel, Végh and Vuletin (2012) show that institutional frameworks characterized by the protection of property rights, the control of corruption, higher bureaucratic quality, and a strong law and order tradition have allowed developing countries to "graduate" from procyclicality in the past decade. Using alternative proxies for institutional quality, Céspedes and Velasco (2014) find evidence consistent with Frankel et al. (2012) in a sample of 60 resource-rich countries, and Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) show that measures of corruption are positively correlated with procyclical fiscal policy.
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Finally, a recent wave of studies that build on insights from the budget institutions literature has taken a deeper look at specific institutional features that could be beneficial in containing procyclical biases. 4 Bova, Carcenac and Guerguil (2014) focus on "second generation" fiscal rules (such as the use of cyclically adjusted fiscal targets or well-defined escape clauses) and find that these have contributed to less procyclicality in the developing world. In an event study analysis, Cordes et al. (2015) present evidence that fiscal policy tends to be countercyclical in the years following the introduction of expenditure rules across emerging economies. Based on a review of the experience of G-20 economies with fiscal consolidation, IMF (2014) shows strong budget institutions to have contributed in preserving public investment from budget cuts in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
The literature reviewed above focuses on understanding the macro determinants of fiscal procyclicality, and provides different explanations as to why aggregate public spending is more procyclical in some countries than others. However, this literature does not explain why certain expenditure components could be more (or less) procyclical. While from an economic standpoint it would be advisable to keep certain expenditure categories either acyclical (e.g., public wages)
or given the size of fiscal multipliers in recessions, countercyclical (e.g., investment), political incentives may distort optimal policy decisions.
As argued by Rogoff (1990) and a long-standing tradition in the political budget cycle literature, politicians have incentives to bias fiscal policy towards expenditures that are favored by voters, regardless of the state of economy (see Drazen, 2000, and Franzese and Long Jusko, 2006 for reviews). Public spending components differ in their production technology: public investment decided at time t, only becomes visible and productive at time t+1, while current expenditures are observed by voters contemporaneously (Rogoff, 1990; Vergne, 2009) . In this sense, current expenditures are immediately visible by voters and hence of more direct political value to politicians. In addition, and vis-à-vis current expenditures, the costs of cutting investment are harder for voters to perceive in bad times so politicians may find it easier to cut capital expenditures during downturns. 5 The assumption that current spending provides immediate political benefits and that payoffs to public investment only materialize with a lag means that political time horizons
should matter in shaping the response of fiscal policy to economic shocks. In particular, this paper puts forward the hypothesis that politicians who discount future payoffs more heavily will be less likely to protect public investment during bad times and more likely to expand current expenditures during good times, and tests the argument against several alternative explanations. Before doing that, we first turn to documenting the asymmetrical behavior of expenditure policy in developing countries.
Data and Estimation
This study uses data from over 100 emerging and developing countries, spanning six different regions (Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Developing Europe, Asia, and the Commonwealth of Independent States) and also presents contrasting evidence for 30 advanced economies. We measure public investment using gross fixed capital formation of the general government (i.e., central plus subnational governments), and use alternative definitions in the robustness section. 6 We measure (primary) current primary expenditures as "expense" minus interest payments, and when available, decompose this category 5 Current voters with sufficiently low levels of altruism could be in favor of capital expenditure cuts rather than current expenditure cuts, something that future generations could oppose (Izquierdo and Kawamura, 2016) . 6 Gross public fixed capital formation is measured by the total value of acquisition less disposals of fixed assets plus certain specified expenditure on services that adds to the value of non-produced assets as the sum of: i) compensation of employees, ii) use of goods and services, iii) social transfers (social security benefits and other social benefits), and if) other current expenditures.
We use data on real GDP series and the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtering technique to estimate output gaps, setting the lambda parameter to 100. Following previous literature, 7 our main controls include the lagged fiscal balance as a percent of GDP, the log difference in the terms of trade, the lagged level of spending (current, capital, respectively) as a share of GDP, and the log of real GDP per capita. The lagged fiscal balance captures available fiscal space to run countercyclical policy, the rate of change in the terms of trade captures the effects of external shocks on fiscal policy, and the lagged level of spending is included to capture the notion that the growth rate of spending could depend on previous spending levels. Table A .1 in the Appendix provides the list of countries included in our study, and Table A .2 presents the sources and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
Our estimation strategy consists of regressing the log difference of real spending on output gap levels and selected control variables. The empirical model for the analysis is as follows:
Where G is the log of real government expenditure category (investment, current) for country i at time t, 1 and 2 are the coefficients measuring the degree of cyclicality of public spending across the different states of the business cycle: good times are defined as those periods when the output gap is positive ( ), and bad times when the output gap is negative ( ), x is a vector of control variables, is a country fixed effect, a time effect, and the overall error term is given by . The cyclicality of different spending components is determined by looking at the sign and size of coefficients: if < (>)0, spending is countercyclical (procyclical). When output is below (above) potential, a positive and statistically significant coefficient means spending is decreasing (increasing). A non-statistically significant coefficient provides evidence of acyclical spending. In addition to testing the hypotheses that 1 and 2 are significantly different from zero individually, we also report the p-value from a (Wald) test of the joint hypothesis that 1 and 2 are both simultaneously equal to 0. Failure to reject this hypothesis provides indication that asymmetrical fiscal responses are not present in the data.
Our choice of dependent variable follows Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004) , who advise against using spending as a proportion of GDP on the left-hand side, since such indicator does not provide an unambiguous reading of the cyclical stance of fiscal policy, and call for extreme caution when drawing conclusions on policy cyclicality based on such indicator (or similar endogenous ones). In turn, the distinction between good and bad times based on observed levels of the output gap draws on the standard approach to capture fiscal asymmetry in the specialized literature (Balassone and Kumar, 2007; Clements, Faircloth and Verhoeven, 2007;  Arze del Granado, Gupta and Hadjdenberg, 2013 and instrumental variables (IV). When using difference GMM, the output gap is instrumented with both "internal" (past values of the endogenous regressor) and "external" instruments. 9 In the latter case, we instrument the output gap of country i with the export-weighted output gap of the country's major trading partners. Table 1 reports our baseline results (without control variables). The specifications in columns 1 and 2 account for country fixed effects (without and with time effects, respectively), and columns 2 and 3 report results of Difference-GMM estimations (using internal and external instruments, respectively). Across all models, an asymmetrical fiscal response can be verified: during downturns, investment spending is reduced: in response to a 1 percentage point widening in the negative output gap, real investment spending decreases by up to 2.2 percent, but current expenditures remain acyclical. During upswings, only current expenditures increases are observed:
Results

Stylized Facts
the growth in real spending associated with a 1 percentage point increase in the positive output gap ranges between 0.7 percent and 2 percent. We formally test for the presence of fiscal asymmetry by looking at the joint hypothesis that POS OG and NEG OG coefficients are the same. 8 The literature on energy price shocks and GDP movements in the United States presents alternative specifications and tests for empirically examining asymmetries (Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011) . See Medina (2016) for an application in the fiscal domain.. 9 We generally use the first and second lag of the positive/negative output gap as instruments. 10 In particular, we consider a fixed set of trading partners (Canada, China, Japan, India, United States and members of the European Union), and when needed, add country-specific partners to explain at least 60 percent of a country's exports.
With the exception of column 2, we can reject at the 5 percent level of significance the hypothesis that 1 and 2 are jointly equal to 0, we thus conclude that fiscal asymmetry is present in both expenditure categories. Table 2 adds several standard controls to the baseline specification: the lagged fiscal balance (LFB), growth in the terms of trade (TOT), the lagged share of spending (investment, current) on GDP (LEXP), and the level of economic development, as measured by (the log of) GDP per capita (GDPpc). While the magnitude and level of significance of the cyclical coefficients are somewhat reduced, the key result remains unchanged: while current expenditure growth reacts positively in good times-but does not fall in bad times-the opposite holds for real capital expenditure growth-i.e., capital expenditure falls in bad times, but it does not increase in good times. To establish the validity of GMM estimators, we rely on two diagnostics tests (see Roodman, 2006) .
Robustness Checks
We first report autocorrelation of order 1 and 2 in the first differenced residuals: they suggest that Table 3 , the coefficients for the output gap are individually statistically insignificant for both spending categories in the sample of advanced economies, pointing to evidence of acyclicality in these types of economies. In addition, we fail to reject the hypothesis that 1 and 2 are both equal to 0, providing further evidence that asymmetry is not present in this sample. Thus, in what follows we focus our discussion on developing countries exclusively, as the result of acyclicality across developed countries was unchanged in all subsequent estimations.
11 While in the case of current expenditure these values are implausibly high, in the case of investment spending column 2 suggests that they are high enough (but below 0.8) to support the joint validity of the instruments used. Table 3 . Advanced Economies
In Table 4 , we test the robustness of our results to changes in the definition of good and bad times. This time we redefine for each country good (bad) times as those years with output gaps above (below) the median gap for the time period under analysis . Again, when output gaps are below (above) the median, public investment (current expenditure) growth is negative (positive), but current expenditures (public investment) does not fall (increase). A similar result is obtained by looking at a second alternative definition of good and times, such as separating between "extreme" recessions and expansions (see Appendix Table A4 ). 
Results on a Country-by-Country Basis
So far we have documented pooled panel estimates that provide "average" effects of the cyclical behavior of expenditures. Following Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004) , this section exploits cross-country variation by presenting correlations of the cyclical components of output and spending across different states of the business cycle. Figure 1 present results from this exercise.
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What stands out at first sight is the high level of heterogeneity in the behavior of fiscal policy.
When it comes to the cyclicality of investment spending during bad times, 60 percent of developing countries show a positive correlation between GDP and capital expenditure, indicating that when output is below potential, government spending on investment tends to decrease. This share is slightly higher (66 percent) in the case of current spending during good times, in which a positive correlation indicates that when output is above potential, government spending tends to increase.
As shown by the bottom panel of Figure 1 , both phenomena are positively correlated, indicating that expenditure decisions on different components are somewhat interdependent, as countries that
show procyclical behavior of current expenditure in good times tend to coincide with those countries that show procyclical behavior of capital expenditure in bad times. Appendix Figure A1 shows variation at the regional level in both dimensions. 13 The following figures show country by country correlations of the cyclical components of spending and GDP conditional on the state of the business cycle (positive vs negative output gap). 
Figure 1. Country Correlations ( ) between Cyclical Components of Government Expenditure and GDP
Determinants of Fiscal Asymmetry
The previous section identified a new empirical regularity that pertains exclusively to developing countries: spending procyclicality affects both current and capital expenditures, but in different ways: good times are associated with current expenditure increases, but no investment spending changes; while in bad times, public investment falls and current spending remains acyclical. This section explores factors associated with this asymmetrical behavior. As discussed in Section 3, the empirical literature presents four key determinants of procyclicality levels: credit constraints, tax base variability, institutional quality, and budget institutions.
14 We measure each factor using the following indicators:
• Credit constraints: We use the financial openness index (FOI) from Chinn and Ito (2006) and an alternative indicator, Standard and Poor's sovereign credit risk ratings (S&P) which is available for a much smaller sample of countries, in which the letter-based system is converted to numerical scale.
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• Tax base variability: The variability is proxied by output volatility, defined by the average of a five-year rolling window of the standard deviation of real GDP growth (VOL).
• Institutional quality: We create a composite index of four different measures from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG): the extent of corruption, the degree of law and order, bureaucratic quality, and the risks of expropriation/repudiation of contracts (IQ). As argued by Keefer and Knack (2007) , this is a measure that captures the vulnerability of the state to special interests capture and the likelihood of rent seeking incentives.
• Budget institutions: Based on the IMF's fiscal rules database (Schaechter et al., 2012) , we introduce a dummy variable indicating whether debt, expenditure, 14 In addition, the latest commodity price cycle has renewed interest in estimating the direct impact of external price shocks on fiscal positions. See Medina (2016) for evidence across Latin America and Céspedes and Velasco (2014) across a broader sample of commodity exporting countries. In this paper, we control for the change in the terms of trade across all of our specifications (with the exception of Table 1 ). The fact that the terms of trade are not significant is probably the result of their effect on the business cycle, which is already included in the regression. 15 We attribute numbers from 0 to 7 to S&P's letter-based system: SD (In default or in breach of an imputed promise); C (highly vulnerable to nonpayment); B (vulnerable to nonpayment); BB (less vulnerable, ongoing uncertainty); BBB (adequate protection parameters); A (strong payment capacity); AA (very strong payment capacity); AAA (highest quality rating). To test for the effects of each of these variables on the cyclicality of spending, we use a variant of equation 1 in which we interact the different stages of the business cycle with each of the relevant factors under analysis. Since, as shown in Section 2, the asymmetry we identify is robust to alternative estimation methods, we present results from fixed effects specifications throughout the rest of the paper. Table 6 reports results from introducing such interactions one at a time until all interactions are present. 16 We thank Era Dabla Norris for kindly sharing this data with us. At each of the budgetary stages, the authors identify five cross-cutting categories: i) top-down procedures, ii) rules and controls, iii) sustainability and credibility, iv) comprehensiveness and v) transparency. 17 That is, countries that score seven on the DPI's legislative and executive indices of electoral competitiveness. The highest score on each index (7) is assigned to countries in which multiple parties compete in elections and no party receives more than 75 percent of the vote (see Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini, 2015 for definitions).
Table 6. Determinants of Spending Cyclicality (fixed effects)
The main result Table 6 shows is that the level of procyclicality of public spending is larger when time horizons are shorter. Using coefficients from Model 5, Figure 2 shows that the procyclical response of public investment during bad times is 4 times larger during election years (t=0) than in the "middle" of a term (t=2), where no significant evidence of procyclicality can be found beyond that point (as the 95 percent confidence interval does not exclude zero). A similar pattern is obtained in the case of current expenditures, when marginal effects are drawn from coefficients in Model 8, while holding the rest of variables at mean values. The bottom panel of Figure 2 indicates that the sample includes many observations on both sides of this threshold. Thus, 696) (0.673) (1.451) (1.731) (1.675) 
Investment spending Current spending
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Note: Constant, YLT, IQ, FOI, VOL, and other controls not reported *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 the effect is not an artifact of the rarity of observations above t=2. Furthermore, in the Appendix we show that our results are not being driven by election years (t=0). Even after introducing dummies for electoral cycles, the YLT-gap interactions retain both magnitude and statistical significance in all specifications (see Appendix Table A5 ).
Figure 2. Effects of Output Gap on Public Spending, Conditional on Time Horizons
Secondly, with respect to other "classical" determinants of procyclicality, we find evidence consistent with previous literature regarding the importance of institutional factors in ameliorating procyclical responses. In the case of public investment, Columns 1-4 show the magnitude of procyclicality during bad times declines as institutional quality improves. For the case of current expenditures, Columns 5-8 of Table 6 show that the interaction of institutional quality and the output gap is negative and statistically significant across all specifications. Using coefficients from Models 5 and 10, Figure 3 shows that countries above median IQ (0.48) are able to protect this type of expenditure during bad times (no significant evidence of procyclicality can be found when countries surpass this threshold) and those countries with relatively lower institutional quality are the ones boosting current spending during good times. The bottom panel of Figure 3 indicates that the diminishing effect is not artifact of the scarcity of observations above median IQ. Finally, we find weak or no evidence that (two different measures of) credit constraints, output volatility, the strength of budget institutions, and the presence of fiscal rules significantly affecting the behavior of public spending over the cycle (see Appendix Figure A2 ). 
Alternative Explanations
The results in Table 6 provide novel evidence that political time horizons have a significant effect on the cyclicality of public expenditures during both good and bad times. This section further illustrates the robustness of this result and addresses several additional country characteristics that could account for the results we observe. First, estimations above abstract from the possible Table 7 , Column 1, we remove countries without exogenous elections, and in Column 2, we restrict the sample to presidential systems in which elections are more likely to proceed on a fixed schedule and not called by the incumbent. 18 Results are robust to these changes: the magnitude of the interaction remains large and statistically significant at conventional levels, although precision drops in the case of current spending cyclicality.
Second, the tendency to increase current expenditures during upswings and cut public investment in bad times could in principle be consistent with the median voter model of redistributive politics, in which the demand for higher current expenditures (e.g., transfers)
increases with the level of inequality (Meltzer and Richards, 1981) . To account for this possibility, Third, an alternative explanation draws on the effects of demographic change (such as population aging) on the composition of government expenditures (Jäger and Schmidt, 2016; Sanz and Velázquez, 2007; Razin, Sadka and Swagel, 2002) . Building on experimental research which find the elderly to discount future payoffs more heavily than working-age people (Harrison, Lau and Williams, 2002; Read and Read, 2004) , the argument is that a rising fraction of elderly people reduces the overall demand for durable public goods, and hence, public investment should decline as the voting power of senior citizens increases (Jäger and Schmidt, 2016) . Note that while this explanation focuses on the long run relationship between the level of public investment and demographics, it may also affect short-term decisions, such as changes in government spending that are the focus of this study. Thus, to explore this possibility and proxy (although imperfectly)
for the relative voting power of elderly citizens, we use the proportion of total population aged 65
and older (POP>65), available from World Development Indicators (WDI). Column 4 shows that 18 An election is exogenous if it occurs in a country with constitutionally determined election intervals and where the election occurs at the fixed interval or within the expected year of the constitutionally fixed term. It is operationalized using the finittrm variable in the DPI. For regime type or government form classification (presidential, parliamentary, etc.) , also see the DPI.
this variable does not exhibit a significant influence on the extent of procylicality of either expenditure type. Fourth, prior research on the political budget cycle points to the age of democracy (Brender and Drazen, 2005) , the age of political parties (Hanusch and Keefer, 2014) , and their organization (whether parties are programmatic or clientelistic) to matter in shaping fiscal policy decisions (Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008; Keefer, 2007) . To examine the effects of these variables, we draw on In Column 2, the use of an alternative measure of public investment is included (the net acquisition of non-financial assets, or NANFA). Consistent with previous findings, the growth rate in NANFA is negative when output is below potential, but as the number of years left in the current term increases, the degree of cyclicality of investment is significantly reduced.
Conclusion
Twenty years after Gavin and Perotti's seminal contribution, the literature on fiscal cyclicality is still growing on several fronts. From a theoretical point of view, existing research continues to identify political distortions as key factor behind procyclical biases and design institutional mechanisms to alleviate them. On the empirical side, as new data for developing countries becomes available, identification issues have been addressed, and specification refinements have led scholars to uncover important policy patterns beyond the typical stylized fact that "fiscal policy in developing (developed) countries is mostly procyclical (countercyclical)."
In an attempt to move this literature forward, we identify a new empirical regularity regarding the reaction of government expenditures to business cycles in a large panel of emerging and developing countries: economic upswings are associated with real current spending increases, outcomes has a long pedigree in political economy research, 19 this paper is to the best of our knowledge one of the first attempts to empirically approximate this mechanism in the context of the cyclical properties of two major spending components.
Overall, the result on fiscal asymmetry is relevant for the current policy debate about the contribution of fiscal policy to equitable growth in developing countries. Previous research suggests that procyclical and volatile fiscal policy negatively affect economic growth (Woo, 2011;  2009), exacerbate macroeconomic volatility (Fatas and Mihov, 2003; 2012) , and hamper attempts at protecting the most vulnerable groups during recessions (Hicks and Wodon, 2001; Ravallion, 2002) . Thus, measures to contain procyclical biases in fiscal policy can be beneficial for improving long-term economic performance and social welfare. However, the discussion of policy alternatives is usually restricted to options such as the strengthening of fiscal frameworks, such as anchoring fiscal policy in terms of fiscal rules that target structural (as opposed to actual) fiscal balances (Frankel, 2011; Kumar and Ter-Minassian, 2007) . Our results suggest that one needs to look at deeper determinants or conditions as well, usually beyond the fiscal rules domain, such as broad institutional and political features shaping politician's incentives and behavior, and thus, policy outcomes.
The analysis here raises questions for future research. One is to examine specific institutions that tend to extend political time horizons. For example, do incumbents that can stand for re-election behave differently than lame-duck politicians? Another avenue is to study the implications of short run policy responses for the composition of public expenditures in the long run: is the cyclical asymmetrical reaction contributing to the secular decline in the share of public investment over total spending? The asymmetric behavior uncovered is particularly important because policies that are procyclical for current expenditure in good times and for capital expenditures in bad times, may lead throughout time to changes in the composition of public spending, with a bias against capital expenditure . Finally, beyond the golden fiscal rule debate, should governments think about other public expenditure composition rules to safeguard public investment from budget cuts or limit the expansion of current spending during good times? These questions are of general policy interest, and will contribute to further develop the analysis on the determinants and consequences of fiscal cyclicality in developing countries. In Table A3 , We instrument the domestic output gap with the output gap of trading partners, weighted by their share of exports. The IV-FE fails to reject the null of the DWH test in seven out of eight cases. 
Figure A1. Box Plots by Region
Note: Box plots are based of country specific correlations between cyclical components of G and GDP during good and bad times. 
Public investment-bad times
Note: Marginal effect graphs are estimated based on coefficients from Table 6 , Column 10, with the exception of Credit Ratings (S&P), and the quality of budget institutions, for which separate models were estimated. 
Current expenditures-good times
